

APPRAISAL REPORT

CAO Appraisal for Audit of IFC

CAO Compliance

C-I-R6-Y08-F096 September 2008

Wilmar Group Indonesia

Case of Forest Peoples Programme

Summary

IFC has three investments with the Wilmar Group—none directly in Wilmar's palm oil plantations in Indonesia, but in palm oil trade facilities and refinery. In 2007, 19 representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) under the lead of Forest Peoples Programme filed a complaint with the CAO, claiming that the Wilmar Group's plantation activities in Indonesia violated a number of IFC standards and requirements. The Wilmar Group's plantations in Indonesia are part of the supply chain of the trade facilities and refinery. The CAO finds that the current procedures for assessing supply chain issues related to IFC investments lack clarity to give sufficient guidance for staff to conduct a consistent review. The CAO therefore finds that there is a *possible* failure in addressing social and environmental outcomes as part of the review process, and that this *might* lead to outcomes contrary to the desired effect of the policy provisions. Consistent with CAO Operational Guidelines, the CAO will develop a Terms of Reference and conduct an audit of IFC on supply chain issues related to the IFC's investment in Wilmar, and the related categorization of IFC's involvement in the Wilmar Group.

Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)

for the

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

Members of the World Bank Group

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About the CAO

The CAO's mission is to serve as a fair, trusted, and effective independent recourse mechanism and to improve the environmental and social accountability of IFC and MIGA.

The CAO (Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman) is an independent post that reports directly to the President of the World Bank Group. The CAO reviews complaints from communities affected by development projects undertaken by the two private sector lending arms of the World Bank Group: the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

For more information about the CAO, please visit www.cao-ombudsman.org



1. Overview of the CAO Compliance Appraisal Process

When the CAO receives a complaint about an IFC or MIGA project, the complaint is first referred to the <u>CAO Ombudsman</u>, which works to respond quickly and effectively to complaints through facilitated settlements, if appropriate. If the CAO Ombudsman concludes that the parties are not willing or able to reach a facilitated solution, the case will be transferred to the compliance arm of CAO, <u>CAO Compliance</u>, to appraise the concerns raised in the complaint for a <u>compliance audit</u> of IFC or MIGA. Alternatively, a compliance audit can be initiated by request from the President of the World Bank Group, the senior management of IFC or MIGA, or at the discretion of the CAO Vice President.

A CAO Compliance <u>appraisal</u> is a preliminary investigation to determine whether the CAO should proceed to a compliance audit of IFC or MIGA. Through CAO Compliance appraisals, the CAO ensures that compliance audits of IFC or MIGA are initiated only for those cases with substantial concerns regarding social or environmental outcomes.

A compliance audit is concerned with assessing the application of relevant policy provisions and related guidelines and procedures to determine whether IFC and MIGA are in compliance. The primary focus of compliance auditing is on IFC and MIGA, but the role of the sponsor may also be considered.

A compliance audit appraisal, and any audit that ensues, must remain within the scope of the original complaint or request. It cannot go beyond the confines of the complaint or request to address other issues. In such cases, the complainant or requestor should consider a new complaint or request.

The CAO compliance appraisal will consider how IFC/MIGA assured itself/themselves of compliance with national law, reflecting international legal commitments, along with other audit criteria. The CAO has no authority with respect to judicial processes. The CAO is not an appeals court or a legal enforcement mechanism, nor is the CAO a substitute for international court systems or court systems in host countries.

The appraisal criteria are set forth in CAO's Operational Guidelines. The criteria are framed as a series of questions to test the value of undertaking a compliance audit of IFC or MIGA. The criteria are as follows:

- Is there evidence (or perceived risk) of adverse social and environmental outcomes that indicates that policy provisions (or other audit criteria) may not have been adhered to or properly applied?
- Is there evidence of risk of significant adverse social and environmental outcomes that indicates that policy provisions, whether or not complied with, have failed to provide an adequate level of protection?



- Is there evidence (or perceived risk) of significant adverse social and environmental outcomes where policy provisions, standards (or other audit criteria), were not thought to be applicable but perhaps should have been applied?
- Is there evidence that the application of some aspect of a policy, standard, guideline or procedure resulted in adverse social and environmental outcomes?
- Can the cause of adverse social and environmental outcomes not be readily identified and corrected through the intervention of the project team without a detailed investigation of the underlying causes or circumstances?
- Could a compliance audit yield information or findings that might better inform the application of policies (or other audit criteria) to future projects?

During appraisal, CAO Compliance holds discussions with the IFC or MIGA project team and other relevant parties to understand the validity of the concerns and to explore whether an audit would be warranted.

After a compliance appraisal has been completed, the CAO can choose only one of two options: to close the case, or to initiate a compliance audit of IFC or MIGA.

The CAO will report and disclose the findings and decision of the CAO compliance appraisal in an appraisal report in order to inform the President of the World Bank Group, the Boards of the World Bank Group, senior management of IFC or MIGA, and the public in writing about its decision.

If the CAO decides to initiate a compliance audit as a result of the compliance appraisal, the CAO will draw up a Terms of Reference for the audit in accordance with CAO's Operational Guidelines.



2. Background and Concerns that Led to the Appraisal

- 1. IFC has undertaken three investments with the Wilmar Group: Wilmar Trading (IFC No. 20348), Delta Wilmar (IFC No. 24644), and Wilmar WCap (IFC No. 25532).
- 2. Nineteen representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) filed a complaint under the lead of Forest Peoples Programme, claiming that the Wilmar Group's activities in Indonesia violated a number of IFC standards and requirements. The CAO Ombudsman transferred the IFC-related allegations to CAO Compliance for a compliance appraisal, while the CAO Ombudsman continues resolving the other matters raised by means of negotiations between the parties.
- 3. IFC's involvement started in 2003 with the first investment, followed by the two other investments in 2006.

Actions by CAO Compliance	
2007	
July 18	CAO receives a complaint from 19 representatives under the lead of Forest
	Peoples Programme. The complaint is dated July 18, 2007.
2008	
March 26	CAO Compliance receives the case for appraisal after the CAO Ombudsman closes the negotiations on claims related to IFC. The CAO Ombudsman continues to support, in parallel, a process of negotiated dispute resolution on the remaining issues.
September 4	CAO Compliance discloses the appraisal report.



3. Scope of the Appraisal for an Audit of IFC

The complainants raised the following specific issues in their complaint:

- 4. <u>Incorrect categorization of the investments</u>: IFC's involvement in Delta Wilmar was classified as category B. The other two IFC investments were classified as category C. The complainants claim that the categorizations are incorrect, due to supply chain issues, among other matters.
- 5. <u>Incorrect application of policies and standards</u>: The complainants claim that the IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures and IFC's Performance Standards and Policies that came into effect on April 30, 2006 should have been applied to the investments in Wilmar that were approved on or after that date.
- 6. <u>Violation of IFC disclosure policy</u>: Besides alleging subsequent violations of IFC's Disclosure Policy as a consequence of the incorrect categorization, the complainants claim that IFC violated the Disclosure Policy by refusing to provide any rationale for the categorization of the investment in Wilmar Wcap, or contact details where the complainants could receive such an explanation, at a meeting held in May 2007.
- 7. <u>Violations of IFC's policies and standards</u>. The complainants claim that:
 - o The Wilmar subsidiaries are not complying with applicable national law, as stated as a requirement in IFC policies and standards.
 - o There are no social and environmental impact assessments or action plans publicly available for Wilmar subsidiaries, as required by IFC's standards.
 - o IFC gave no attention to Performance Standard 5, or to the prior policy on involuntary resettlement, when assessing the projects.
 - o IFC gave no attention to Performance Standard 6, or to the prior policies and guidelines concerned with preserving biodiversity, when assessing the projects.
 - o IFC gave no attention to Performance Standard 7, or to the prior policy on indigenous people, when assessing the projects.
- 8. Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO): The complainants further state that IFC has repeatedly, explicitly and incorrectly claimed that Wilmar is compliant with principles and criteria adopted in 2005 by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil.
- 9. The complainants further state that the adverse impacts on the ground include:
 - o Illegal use of fire to clear lands
 - Clearance of primary forests
 - o Clearance of areas of high conservation value
 - o Take over of indigenous peoples' customary lands without due process
 - Failure to carry out free, prior, and informed consultations with indigenous peoples leading to broad community support
 - o Failure to negotiate with communities or abide by negotiated agreements



- o Failure to establish agreed areas of smallholdings
- o Social conflicts triggering repressive actions by companies and security forces
- Failure to carry out or wait for approval of legally required environmental impact assessments
- o Clearance of tropical peat and forests without legally required permits.



4. CAO Findings

The appraisal finds the following:

- 10. IFC investment in Wilmar Trading (IFC No. 20348) and Delta Wilmar (IFC No. 24644)
 - 10a. IFC categorized its investments in Wilmar Trading and Delta Wilmar according to provisions that were applicable at that time: the 1998 Environmental and Social Review Procedures and the World Bank Group Safeguard Policies. These provisions did not require supply chain issues to be considered. For clarity: the categorization B given by IFC to the investment in Delta Wilmar was not related to supply chain issues, but issues IFC identified as related to the specific project site location in Ukraine.
 - 10b. IFC states in its response to the CAO that for the investment in Wilmar Trading, it went beyond usual practice and made a broader consideration of the associated risk. IFC also reviewed a Wilmar Group refinery as part of a broader review.
 - 10c. IFC states in its response to the CAO that for the investment in Delta Wilmar, it was aware of the external environmental and social concerns about palm oil supply chain issues, and that IFC went beyond the requirements applicable at the time by performing an additional review, visiting several plantations in West Kalimantan and West Sumatra, Indonesia.
 - 10d. IFC states in the Summary of Project Information (SPI) for Delta Wilmar that all potential impacts emanating from refinery operations may be avoided or mitigated by adhering to generally recognized standards, guidelines or design criteria.
- 11. IFC investment in Wilmar WCap (IFC No. 25532)
 - 11a. The Wilmar WCap investment was reviewed by IFC under the Performance Standards and the revised environmental and social review procedure that came into effect in April 2006. IFC correctly identifies that Performance Standard 1 notes the need to consider supply chain issues. IFC states that it did consider supply chain issues consistent with the requirement in Performance Standard 1 by conducting an overview of some of Wilmar's plantations. IFC states that at that time, overall, these operations were being managed in the spirit of the draft Roundtable of Sustainable Palm Oil Principles and Criteria. IFC states in its presentation to the Board that it will work with Wilmar to develop an assistance program to promote sustainable on-plantation practices by the palm oil suppliers. IFC categorized its investment in Wilmar WCap as a category C as per IFC standard practice and current environmental and social review procedures for trade finance facilities.
 - 11b. IFC states in the SPI for Wilmar WCap that the investment will have minimal or no direct, adverse social or environmental impacts, and that the client is committed to high standards of sustainability and corporate responsibility throughout its palm oil supply chains. The SPI for Wilmar WCap further addresses the performance of Wilmar International's Indonesian operations and of Wilmar's crude palm oil mills.



- 12. IFC states in its response to the CAO that it works proactively, and has initiated an internal reconsideration of how IFC categorizes trade finance facilities.
- 13. IFC correctly disclosed the information and rationale for categorization as required by the 1998 and 2006 Environmental and Social Review Procedures for category C and B investments.
- 14. In response to the lack of application of Performance Standards, or earlier policies, on involuntary resettlement, biodiversity, compliance with national law, and indigenous people relevant for Wilmar's plantations, IFC responded to the CAO that it has no investment in the Wilmar Group's plantation operations: Wilmar Trading and Wilmar WCAP are purely trading operations with no fixed assets; and the project site related to the Delta Wilmar did not trigger any of the above-mentioned policies. IFC states that it therefore lacks formal legal leverage to implement any specific requirement on the plantation operations.
- 15. The CAO finds no IFC provision that a lack of formal legal leverage for IFC to implement Performance Standards should preclude such standards from being applicable.



5. The CAO Decision

The CAO concludes the following:

- 16. There is an inconsistency in IFC's approach to the supply chain issues. While, during its review process, IFC identifies potential impacts outside the legal entities that are the recipients of IFC investments, these potential impacts are not consistently addressed. IFC did assess the performance of the Wilmar Group's plantations, but not to any fixed, or agreed, set of standards. IFC states that it assured itself that the Wilmar Group's plantations were properly managed, but when challenged on actual applicability of IFC standards, IFC responded by referring to a lack of legal leverage to implement such standards.
- 17. There are no IFC provisions stating that a lack of formal legal leverage to implement requirements determines the applicability of performance standards. The reference to lack of leverage to implement IFC standards as a consequence of lack of a formal legal vehicle to do so is inconsistent with arguments used by IFC to defend other investments.¹
- 18. The CAO finds that the current procedures for assessing supply chain issues related to IFC investments lack clarity and provide insufficient guidance for staff when conducting reviews. The CAO therefore finds that there is a *possible* failure in addressing social and environmental outcomes as part of the review process, and that this *might* lead to outcomes contrary to the desired effect of the policy provisions.
- 19. Consistent with CAO Operational Guidelines, the CAO will develop a Terms of Reference and conduct an audit of IFC on supply chain issues, and the related categorization, of IFC's involvement in the Wilmar Group.

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¹ IFC typically invests as a minority shareholder, with a promise to IFC's Board that IFC will implement its social and environmental standards without the formal legal leverage to ensure such implementation.